University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Occasional Papers

Law School Publications

2005

Three Strategies of Interpretation
Adrian Vermeule

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/occasional_papers
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Adrian Vermeule, "Three Strategies of Interpretation," University of Chicago Law Occasional Paper, No. 44 (2005).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Occasional Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE
LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NUMBER 44
2005

Occasional Papers from
the University of Chicago Law School
NUMBER

44

JANUARY 2005

Three Strategies of Interpretation
by Adrian Vermeule
BernardD. Meltzer Professor of Law

"Three Strategies of Interpretation" was prepared for
the University of San Diego Law School conference
"What is Legal Interpretation?" and is forthcoming
in the San Diego Law Review in 2005.
Occasional Paper #44 is published in honor of the
creation of the Bernard D. Meltzer Professorship at the
University of Chicago Law School, and in honor of the
first professor to hold the chair, Adrian Vermeule.

WE MAY DISTINGUISH THREE STYLES
OR STRATEGIES OF DECISIONMAKING.
Under a maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses
the action whose consequences are best for the case at hand
(defining "best" according to some value the decisionmaker
holds). Where decisionmakers choose the action that is
best relative to constraints, accounting for the direct costs
and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the
approach optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the
maximizer focuses only on the case at hand, the optimizer
acts so as to maximize value over an array of cases. In contrast
to both approaches, satisficing permits any decision whose
results in the case at hand are good enough-although we
will see that satisficing, like optimizing, may itself represent
an indirect strategy of maximization.
In what follows, I will suggest that these distinctions illuminate legal interpretation. Interpretation is just
another type of decisionmaking, so interpreters must use
some decision-procedure or other. Many approaches to the
interpretation of statutes and the Constitution are maximizing approaches that attempt to produce as much as possible
of some value the interpreter holds-for example, fidelity
to legislative intent or original understandings. Optimizing
approaches to interpretation condemn maximizing interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the costs
of decisionmaking and the costs of interpretive error. An
alternative to both maximizing and optimizing approaches
is a satisficing style of interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search for the very best interpretation (even
within constraints), instead selecting an interpretation
that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the
interpreter holds. The choice among decisionmaking strategies is utterly agnostic about the underlying value theory;
whatever such theory the interpreter holds, there is always a
separate question about which decision-procedures are best
suited to promote the decisionmaker's aims.
I will criticize the maximizing style of interpretation
and praise its two competitors. Both the optimizing and
satisficing perspectives, I suggest, help in different ways to
justify some controversial principles of statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the rule barring resort to
legislative history where statutes have a plain meaning, and
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clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or "intratextualist") interpretation of statutes and the Constitution.
Although maximizing interpretation is untenable, neither
the optimizing approach nor the satisficing approach is
globally best; each is an attractive decision-procedure in
some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes are either very
low or very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not
rational in some stronger sense), while optimizing is best
suited to medium-stakes decisions.
I begin, in SECTION I, by clarifying the conceptual
distinctions between and among maximizing, optimizing
and satisficing. SECTION II identifies interpretive styles
that draw upon these decisionmaking strategies, criticizes
some prominent examples of maximizing interpretation,
and examines some contested interpretive principles that
the optimizing and satisficing perspectives might justify.
SECTION III offers some considerations that bear upon
the choice between optimizing and satisficing as interpretive strategies. SECTION IV considers the wide appeal of
maximizing styles of interpretation, and suggests some
mechanisms that cause maximizing interpretation to
appear more attractive than it should. This is not an occasion for ponderous work, so my aim throughout is simply
to sketch ideas; I make no effort at a comprehensive and
detailed treatment.
I. MAXIMIZING, OPTIMIZING AND SATISFICING
The standard model of rational decisionmaking defines
rational choice as the choice that maximizes some value.
In a common interpretation, the value to be maximized is
welfare, in turn defined (contentiously) as the satisfaction
of subjective preferences. Nothing inherent in the model,
however, requires this; the idea of rational choice deployed
in decision theory is strictly formal. The decisionmaker
simply ranks the outcomes of possible actions according to
some scale ofvalue and chooses the maximizing action-the
action that produces the highest value. The model can be
extended to cover situations of risk, in which the outcomes
of actions are probabilistic rather than certain, by taking
the maximand to be expected value. In situations of uncertainty, where not even the probabilities of various outcomes
are known, one view suggests that decisionmakers can simply assign subjective probabilities, converting uncertainty
back into risk; other views propose other choice criteria,
such as maximin (maximizing the minimum payoff). The
distinctions between certainty, risk and uncertainty are
orthogonal to the issue I address here; the important point
4
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is that in all of these situations, the standard model defines
rational choice as maximizing choice.
In the simplest versions of the standard model, the
feasible set of actions or options is just given. Here the
idea of satisficing is incoherent. How could it be rational,
in a static context, to choose anything other than the best
available action-to do anything other than maximizing?
Some philosophers suggest that it can be rational to choose
less than the best, so long as the action chosen is satisfactory. But if the action chosen is less than the best and also
satisfactory, than the best action is also satisfactory, and
satisficing gives no reason to choose the former over the
latter. In static contexts, the superiority of maximizing to
satisficing is conceptually entailed by the scale of value the
decisionmaker uses.
Satisficing comes into its own, however, when
decisionmaking is viewed more dynamically. In many realworld decisions, the set of options is itself (at least partially)
the product of earlier decisions. One of the most important questions decisionmakers face is the extent of rational
search: how many options, and how much information,
should be sought out and considered before an ultimate
choice is made? Here satisficing is coherent; as Herbert
Simon emphasized, satisficing is a constraint on further
search for new information and new options. The satisficer
searches only until finding a choice whose outcomes are
good enough. By satisficing with respect to the particular
decision at hand, the satisficer conserves time and other
resources that may then be expended on other decisions.
In dynamic settings, optimizing is also best understood as a constraint on further search for new options or
new information. Maximizing always takes place within
budget constraints, especially time. To maximize in the
simpleminded sense of searching until one finds the very
best option in the case at hand, all things considered, is to
neglect the opportunity costs of search. (Although simpleminded maximizing in the case at hand is indefensible,
I will also claim below that it is a common approach to
interpretive decisionmaking). The antonym of satisficing,
on this view, is not simpleminded maximizing. Rather it is
optimizing, by which we denote maximization that takes
into account constraints, such as the cost of searching for
further information and options. The optimizer searches
until the costs of further search equal or exceed the expected
benefits of additional information, or of new options.
In what follows, then, I shall contrast three different
decisionmaking strategies: maximizing, taken to mean a
simpleminded effort to find the very best choice, all things
ADRIAN VERMEULE
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considered, in the particular decisionmaking context at
hand; optimizing, or maximization that takes into account
the direct costs and opportunity costs of acquiring information and making decisions; and satisficing. Optimizing
and satisficing are different ways of pursuing the same
larger aim. Both strategies rest on an implicit recognition
that to do what is best, all things considered, with respect
to some particular decision in an array of decisions is to
do something that may not be globally best, or best from
some larger perspective. Both strategies, in other words, are
second-order maximizing: to maximize globally, the decisionmaker may do best to choose in a way that is less than
maximally best with respect to the local decision at hand.
It is important to be clear, however, that optimizing
and satisficing are different second-order decision strategies.
The two strategies employ different stopping rules, or rules
for constraining further search among possible options.
The optimizer stops searching when the marginal benefit
of finding a better option, discounted by the probability of
finding such an option, is equal to or less than the costs of
further search. The satisficer stops searching when she finds
an option that is good enough. Although the two strategies sometimes yield similar choices, sometimes they do
not, and even if they were extensionally equivalent, the two
strategies would still embody different rules for choosing.
As the reference to stopping rules suggests, the jurisprudential distinction between rules and standards is
relevant here. Maximizing is the ultimate standard: the
maximizer does what is best, all things considered, taking
into account the totality of the circumstances relevant to
the local decision at hand. Optimizing and satisficing strategies both appeal to the higher-order virtues of rules, to
the idea that a decisionmaker who takes into account less
than the full set of considerations that bear on a particular
decision may for a range of reasons do better, over a whole
array of decisions, than does the simpleminded maximizer.
Yet this conceptual point about the possible virtues of
rules does not purport to specify the content of the rules.
Optimizing and satisficing strategies are different stopping
rules that use different means to their common aim of
global maximization. "An optimizing strategy places limits
on how much we are willing to invest in seeking alternatives. A satisficing strategy places limits on how much we
insist on finding before we quit that search and turn our
attention to other matters."
Here is an illustration of the three strategies. Three
decision theorists-M,O, and S-enter the main university cafeteria, which holds no less than twenty separate
6
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stations, each of which o s a different type of cuisine.
M is a simpleminded maxhizer who seeks the most satisfying possible meal rightnow; M spends the next hour
visiting each station, pordering possible choices, and so
on. (By the time M is diie choosing his meal, 0 and S
have finished eating andare back in their offices working on papers). 0 is a scond-order maximizer, who sees
that maximizing her sa faction from this particular meal
is suboptimal from a .rall perspective. 0 thus adopts a
stopping rule that is catulated to optimize her satisfaction,
taking into account Jcision costs and opportunity costs.
Calculating the mar nal costs and benefits, 0 decides to
visit five randomlylelected stations out of the possible
twenty, and then tychoose from within this set the station
whose offering maimizes the satisfaction of O's tastes. S is
also a second-ord{ maximizer, but she employs a different
stopping rule: Sproceeds along the stations until he finds
an offering tha/is good enough, and then stops searching.
Although 0 nd S may happen to light upon the same
offering, the is no guarantee that they will do so; and
although its true that both 0 and S manage to avoid the
plight of te obsessive and self-defeating M, they have used
different irategies to that end.
Of course no maximizer really considers all things.
M wil eventually choose a meal, rather then spending an
infini'e amount of time evaluating micro-features of the
alteinatives. Yet M may spend far more time and effort on
th/local choice than would be justified from a secondoiler, globally maximizing perspective. Although the local
viaximizer will stop at some point, that point may lie far
/eyond the local optimum, as identified from the global
/point of view.
II. DECISIONMAKING AND INTERPRETATION
What does all this have to do with interpretation? Many
debates over interpretive practices are debates over the
decision procedures interpreters should use. These debates
include important questions about how much information interpreters should collect, what set of possible
interpretations to consider, and what stopping rules they
should use as constraints on further search for information. Examining the history and theory of statutory and
constitutional interpretation in America, we can identify
interpretive styles that correspond to, and implicitly draw
upon, the decisionmaking strategies we have identified.
Rather than pursue this theme in the abstract, I will
proceed by demonstration, examining just two of the
ADRIAN VERMEULE
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many settings in which the colast among these interpretive strategies shows plainly. Te first involves the debate
over legislative history and th plain meaning rule; the
second involves the debate, in oth statutory and constitutional arenas, over the weight t be accorded to statutory
or constitutional clauses other han the clauses directly
at issue-including, in the startory setting, the question how much attention courtsShould pay to statutes
in par materia.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE PLAINMEANING RULE

Suppose interpreters are intentionalis: they subscribe to
some high-level political theory, peraps an account of
representative democracy, according t. which legislators'
intentions make the law. Intentionalismthus supplies the
value theory that defines what counts a a good or bad
interpretation: a good interpretation is ole that captures
legislators' intentions. Suppose also that th scale of value
is continuous: interpretations may capture nore or less of
the legislators' true intentions, and the more 4\e better.
Maximizing. In light of this value theory the intentionalist interpreter who is also a simpleminded'naximizer
will proceed to search as widely as possible for inbrmation
about legislators' intentions in the case at hand.'On this
view, interpreters may begin by consulting statutoxy text
for evidence of legislative intent. But there is nothir special about text; interpreters will range beyond the statue to
consult legislative history, previous and subsequent statues,
perhaps even in-court testimony from the statute's draftes.
This expansive search for further information about legisla\
tors' intentions follows from the assumption that "there is
no invariable rule for the discovery of legislative intention";
any source is in principle admissible, and should be given
whatever probative weight it intrinsically deserves.
Despite its intuitive appeal, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism of this sort is exposed to serious
objections. It neglects the direct costs and opportunity
costs of searching further and further afield for evidence
of legislative intentions. We may sort these costs into two
rough categories, decision costs and error costs. Holding
constant the accuracy of decisions, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism produces wasted effort (from an ex
post standpoint) whenever the interpretation the court
ultimately settles upon, after extensive review of collateral
sources, is the same interpretation it would have reached
with a more restricted set of sources. Holding the costs
of decision constant, searching further and further afield
might even reduce accuracy even in the decision at hand,
8
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if maximizers with constrained cognitive and information-processing capacities become bewildered by a large
set of conflicting evidence. Furthermore, decision costs
and accuracy interact over the whole array of cases. Even if
collecting more and more evidence of legislative intentions
in Case 1 increases accuracy in that case, the opportunity
cost of search means that the intentionalist interpreter will
have less time to spend on Case 2 than she would if decisionmaking resources were distributed more evenly over
cases-which means that the interpreter will tend to perform less accurately in Case 2.
Optimizing. An important alternative to simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism, then, is optimizing
intentionalism, which constrains the search for evidence of
legislators' intentions by reference to a larger cost-benefit
calculus. The optimizing intentionalist employs a stopping
rule: she declines to search further afield if the expected
benefits of further search are less than the costs, including
among the latter both the decision costs of search and the
chance that new sources will reduce accuracy by driving a
fallible interpreter off a correct interpretation that a smaller
set of sources would have suggested. This description of
the optimizing intentionalist calculus is abstract. We have
sketched the variables the optimizing intentionalist takes
into account, but the specific decision-rules that result
depend on what values those variables actually take-an
empirical issue. My point here is just that, given certain
values of the relevant variables, the notion of an optimizing-intentionalist stopping rule provides a justification for
considering less than all probative information bearing on
legislative intentions in particular cases-even for interpreters fully committed to intentionalism as a high-level
account of statutes' authority.
For a concrete example, we might consider something
like the version of intentionalism embodied in the "plain
meaning rule." Under that rule, legislative intent is the
ultimate object of interpretation, but clear statutory text is
conclusive evidence of legislative intent. The plain meaning
rule is a stopping rule: the interpreter stops searching for
further evidence of legislative intentions when the statutory text is clear. Further search, say into legislative history,
is permissible only when the statutory text is ambiguous or
otherwise lacks a plain meaning.
Thus in Caminetti v. United States the Court affirmed
a conviction under the White Slave Traffic Act of a man
who had transported a woman across state lines to become
his mistress, reasoning that the statute's prohibition of
interstate transportation for any "immoral purpose" was
ADRIAN VERMEULE
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so plain as to obviate the need for any recourse to legislative history-even though that history, according to the
dissenters, showed that the intent of the prohibition was
to criminalize only prostitution or other commercialized
immorality. Although the Court conceded that legislative
history "may aid the courts in reaching the true meaning of
the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation," it held
that "the language being plain, it is the sole evidence of the
ultimate legislative intent."
Nothing in the optimizing-intentionalist view of
Caminetti, and the plain meaning rule, excludes or needs
to exclude the possibility that the dissenters in Caminetti
were correct. Perhaps the plain meaning did not actually
track legislators' intentions, and the legislative history
would have revealed them. From the second-order standpoint of the optimizing decisionmaker, this is just to repeat
the point that the plain meaning rule tolerates results that
are suboptimal or erroneous in the decision at hand, all
things considered, for the sake of better results over an
array of interpretive decisions.
This tradeoff can, under certain circumstances, be
beneficial on net. Suppose that plain statutory text is usually excellent evidence of legislative intent, and that going
beyond statutory text into voluminous and complex legislative history often produces high decision costs and
opportunity costs. Given finite time and decisionmaking
capacity, and an array of future cases that must be decided,
the interpreter may do better overall by allocating less
effort to discerning legislative intentions in the particular
case at hand, while allocating more effort to other cases
in the array. Moreover, simpleminded maximizing past the
optimum point may produce little improvement in accuracy even in the very case at hand. It is quite possible that
simpleminded intentionalist maximizing in a given case
will reduce accuracy, even in that very case, if cognitively
fallible interpreters are confused or led astray by legislative
history that drives them off the correct interpretation that
plain statutory text would otherwise indicate. For any of
these reasons, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism
will do worse, from a higher-order perspective, than optimizing intentionalism that employs a stopping rule. Again,
I do not argue here that the plain meaning rule is indeed
the best stopping rule for intentionalists; to know that, we
would have to know more than we currently do. I only
mean to indicate a type of justification for the plain meaning rule that is invisible to the maximizing interpreter.
Satisficing. A different stopping rule for intentionalist interpreters would be to search until, but only until, an
10
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interpretation turns up that is satisfactory. The optimizing
intentionalist, in a case like Caminetti, proceeds on the
basis of a rule that is calculated to produce the best possible
interpretation given the resource constraints, including limited time and limited cognitive capacity, under which the
interpreter labors. The satisficing intentionalist employs a
different approach. Rather than searching for the best possible interpretation, even under constraints, the satisficer
sets a limit to search by accepting the first interpretation
that is good enough.
A satisficing interpreter might come to the same result
as did the Caminetti court, not on the ground that the
costs of further search for evidence of legislative intentions
would be greater than the expected benefits, but simply on
the ground that the plain meaning of the text provided an
account of legislators' intentions that was internally consistent, intuitively plausible, and in that sense good enough.
The idea animating this relaxed attitude is that a maximizing search for the very best account of legislators' intentions
would be a sort of local perfectionism; and local perfectionism would make the interpretive system worse off, from a
higher-order point of view. As with optimizing, satisficing
intentionalism may produce a better allocation of time and
effort across a whole array of cases than does simpleminded
maximizing in each particular case. As compared to the
optimizer, the satisficer uses a different decision rule to
produce the globally-maximizing allocation, but the aim of
global maximization is the same.
An interesting implication of the satisficing account
is that the interpretation the court produces is sensitive to
the order in which materials are considered. In our cafeteria example, which offering the satisficing consumer ends
up choosing depends upon which end of the cafeteria she
starts from (assuming there are satisfactory offerings at
various points in the line). In Caminetti, a court that (1)
employed a satisficing stopping rule but that (2) considered
legislative history before statutory text would conclude that
the legislative history offered a fully satisfactory account of
legislators' intentions. The bare idea of satisficing, by itself,
cannot justify a rule that intentionalist interpreters should
stop with the plain (and satisfactory) meaning of the text,
as opposed to the plain (and satisfactory) meaning of the
legislative history. But this is no serious objection to the
satisficer. In any decisionmaking setting in which less than
all possible alternatives are to be searched out and considered, one must begin somewhere. The satisficing interpreter
will satisfice at this higher level also, accepting any starting
point that is good enough.
ADRIAN VERMEULE
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The starting point will thus be set by convention,
within any particular legal system. In our legal system, the
convention is that statutory text is the starting point, and
intentionalist stopping rules constrain the search for evidence beyond the text. The convention might be otherwise,
as far as the satisficing perspective goes, but it actually isn't
otherwise. The satisficing judge in our legal system has no
reason to lose sleep over what satisficing interpreters might
do in other, possibly counterfactual legal systems.
The allure ofmaximizing intentionalism.A simple idea,
which seems intuitive to many, is that the intentionalist
interpreter should consider all relevant and probative evidence of legislative intentions in the case at hand. To deny
this is to lose the rhetorical high ground (a point to which
I return in Section IV): the maximizing intentionalist can
always lampoon the optimizing or satisficing intentionalist
by pointing to some particular case in which an optimizing
or satisficing stopping rule would cause the interpreters to
miss out on highly probative evidence of intentions. On
either the optimizing or satisficing perspectives, however,
this sort of argument is a simpleminded mistake, if it counsels neglect of the costs of decisionmaking and the risks of
error (the optimizer's worry) and neglect of the perils of
local perfectionism (the satisficer's worry).
If simpleminded maximizing intentionalism is mistaken, it is also a prominent and often dominant strand
in American legal interpretation. Consider the famous
Holy Trinity case, in which the Court without much ado
discarded the traditional rule against consulting internal
committee reports as evidence of legislative intentions. The
Court said very little to justify this crucial methodological move, but it might have seemed the most natural thing
in the world. After all, a famous intentionalist injunction
held that "where the mind labours to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be
derived." The pre-Holy Trinity court had combined this rule
with a rule barring judicial consideration of internal legislative evidence; to the Holy Trinity court, this must have
seemed an odd, even incoherent combination, akin to telling ajury to "consider all relevant evidence" while excluding
the smoking gun the police seized from the defendant.
In both the exclusionary-rule setting and the interpretive setting, however, it is familiar that there may be good
higher-order reasons to adopt seemingly conflicted rulecombinations of this sort. What I add here is a taxonomy
of, and contrast between, two different interpretive decision strategies grounded in higher-order considerations.
Those strategies have a common enemy or antonym,
12
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however; both are alternatives to the sort of simpleminded
maximizing intentionalism that has been so prominent in
the history of American interpretive theory and practice.
CLAUSE-BOUND TEXUALISM AND HOLISTIC TEXTUALISM

The previous example assumed an intentionalist account
of interpretation. Here I offer an example premised on a
strictly textualist account of interpretation, to show that
textualist interpreters also face the choice among maximizing, optimizing and satisficing styles of interpretation.
The choice among decisionmaking strategies, I have suggested, is entirely agnostic as among various value theories
different interpreters might hold; textualists as well as
intentionalists must pursue their aims by means of some
decision-procedure.
Suppose an interpreter believes that the aim of interpretation is to capture the ordinary meaning of statutory
or constitutional text, quite apart from anyone's intentions.
(I bracket here, as irrelevant for our purposes, the possible
justifications for this view). The textualist interpreter faces a
range of implementation issues that must be confronted to
make her high-level commitment operational. How exactly
should the textualist view be embodied in decision-procedures that interpreters will use? Of these implementation
questions, I consider only the following: How much text
should the interpreter consider? Suppose there is both a
primary text, a statutory section or constitutional clause
whose interpretation will settle the rule of law that applies
between the parties, and collateral texts, such as other provisions of the Constitution or of the relevant statute, or
other statutes. How widely should the textualist interpreter
cast her net, and how much weight should be given to collateral texts?
This issue underlies important debates in both statutory and constitutional interpretation. In the statutory
arena, the Court has at times adopted a strong presumption of textual coherence across whole statutes, on the view
that textual similarities and differences across provisions are
at least presumptively significant. Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey
goes even further, suggesting that interpreters should treat
the whole U.S. Code as though terms are used consistently
across statutes. In constitutional interpretation, Akhil Amar
defends an "intratextualist" view that makes extensive use
of comparisons across clauses, even to the point of insisting
that words appearing in widely separated contexts be given
similar meanings. Elsewhere in the constitutional arena,
there are occasional hints of an even more expansive interADRIAN VERMEULE
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textualist" view, analogous to the Casey opinion; on this
view, the Constitution would be read in light of collateral
legal texts, such as the Declaration of Independence and
the Northwest Ordinance. What these views have in common is a (more or less expansive) commitment to holistic
or coherent textualism, as opposed to the sort of clausebound textualism that focuses principally or solely on the
statutory or constitutional provisions directly applicable in
the case at hand.
Maximizing. The textualist interpreter who is also a
simpleminded maximizer seeks the ordinary meaning of a
legal term in the provision at hand. Other provisions of
the same text, or other legal texts, use the same term or
use different terms in ways that illuminate by contrast. The
simplemindedly maximizing textualist reasons that interpreters should consult collateral texts as widely as possible,
and give them whatever weight they intrinsically deserve,
all things considered, to whatever extent they happen to
provide relevant evidence of ordinary meaning. Indeed,
on this construal there is nothing at all special about legal
texts; any sources of ordinary meaning will do, such as
dictionaries, literature or the testimony of linguists. The
reductio ad nauseam of the search for ordinary meaning is
not Casey. It is the debate in Muscarello v. United States over
the meaning of the statutory term carry, as in "carry a
firearm." The case occasioned heated subsidiary debates
over usage in the Bible, Melville, Defoe, and M*A*S*H,
and saw Justice Breyer (or his clerks) attempt to discern
ordinary meaning by collecting examples from a database
of national newspapers and then "randomly" sampling the
results-a procedure that fails to account for selection bias
in the database itself, akin to taping speeches at a convention of spit-and-polish grammarians and then "randomly"
sampling the results to see whether it is ordinary usage to
split infinitives.
Optimizing and satisficing. Simplemindedly maximizing textualism fails on the same grounds that condemn
simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism. The key
points are familiar. First, holding constant the quality of
decisions (from a textualist perspective), the direct decision
costs and opportunity costs of holistic textualism are real,
and perhaps quite high. The refined and comprehensive
comparisons required by maximizing textualism take time.
The time spent searching out and comparing usage across
the whole Code, or within a database, means less time to be
spent on refined textualism in other cases. Second, holding
the costs of decisionmaking constant holistic textualism
may do worse even according to the very value theory pre14
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supposed by maximizing textualism itself. As compared to
clause-bound textualism, holistic or expansive textualism
requires a more complicated and information-intensive
inquiry, one that will reduce decisional accuracy whenever
fallible interpreters read the comparison texts mistakenly.
There is no particular reason to think that the illuminating
effect of holistic texualism will predominate over its errorproducing effect. Third, and related to the last, holistic
textualism in the hands of fallible interpreters risks producing a holistic, highly coherent, but fundamentally mistaken
analysis, one that enforces a simultaneous misreading of
a whole set of related provisions. Risk-averse interpreters might prefer the limited incoherence of clause-bound
interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erroneous
universal account.
In light of these considerations, both optimizers and
satisficers will hold that textualists need a stopping rule
that constrains the ever-expanding search for evidence
of ordinary meaning. A consequence of this is the standard tradeoff of local inferiority for global superiority.
Optimizing textualists and satisficing textualists will both
be willing to render interpretations in particular cases that
are inferior from a textualist standpoint to those that an
infallible maximizing textualist would render. The hope,
for both optimizers and satisficers, is that local inferiority
will prove globally superior across a set of decisions-again,
superior on the same value theory that the locally-maximizing textualist holds.
But optimizers and satisficers will employ different
stopping rules to promote their common aim of superior
performance from a global perspective. The optimizing textualist attempts to calculate the point at which the expected
marginal benefit of further evidence of textual meaning is
equal to or less than the expected marginal cost, and stops
there. The satisficing textualist stops when the text(s) she
has examined point to an ordinary meaning that seems
satisfactory-one that is plausible to her, in light of her
native linguistic competence, that suggests a rational legislative policy, and so forth. Perhaps a database search, or a
deep understanding of Melville, would make the meaning
on which the satisficing interpreter has alighted seem less
satisfactory than it currently does. But the satisficer refuses
to lose sleep over that possibility, not because she anticipates that the costs of further search equal or exceed the
expected benefits, but because she believes that the perfectionist search for the very best local interpretation is often
a self-defeating enterprise, from a global perspective. She
believes that yielding to the siren song of local perfectionADRIAN VERMEULE
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ism will make her performance worse, overall, than does
her resolute (even phlegmatic) disposition to take the good
in preference to searching for the best.
As usual, the two stopping rules might happen to converge to similar results. An opinion that both optimizing
textualists and satisficing textualists might love is Dewsnup
v. Timm, in which the Court interpreted the phrase
"allowed secured claim" in §506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
while ignoring holistic arguments that the phrase "allowed
secured claim" in §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code might
have something to do with the matter-adopting instead
what Justices Scalia and Souter, in dissent, derided as a
"one-subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory exegesis."
To the intentionalist or textualist maximizer, opinions like
Dewsnup seem foolishly narrow. Why not consider an obviously relevant collateral provision when interpreting the
provision at hand? To the optimizer or the satisficer, however, stopping with §506(d) might be a good idea, either
because fathoming the complexities of §506(a) is itself a
daunting task for generalist interpreters (so daunting that
the costs of a wider inquiry outrun the expected benefits),
or because the Court's straightforward interpretation of
§506(d) was itself a satisfactory local solution.
Before we leave these examples, a general caution is in
order. It has not been my enterprise here to defend, substantively, any particular interpretive decision-procedures
or results. Whether the optimizer or satisficer should actually defend an opinion like Dewsnup will depend on the
precise shape of the cost-benefit curves (to the optimizer)
or the level of judicial aspiration (to the satisficer). I merely
aim to illustrate two justifications for using truncated
interpretive decision-procedures, justifications that must
forever remain invisible to the maximizing interpreter. Nor
do I mean to express any view about which interpretive
strategy it would be best for judges in particular to use. A
general issue is that suitable interpretive decision-procedures will vary with the institutional capacities of different
interpreters occupying different roles, and with regard to
the systemic interactions of different institutions. I confine
myself here to mapping the conceptual terrain; choosing
interpretive decision-procedures for particular interpreters
turns on empirical questions, about institutional capacities
and systemic effects, that I do not address.
III. OPTIMIZING OR SATISFICING?
If simpleminded local maximizing is an untenable interpretive posture, which stopping rule should interpreters
16
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use? Proponents of optimizing, on the one hand, and satisficing, on the other, have each offered generic arguments
that seek to knock out the rival stopping rule, leaving their
preferred rule in sole possession of the field, as the only
valid alternative to simpleminded maximizing. Here I offer
some brief remarks on these generic arguments, only to suggest that they fail. There is no knockout argument against
either optimizing or satisficing as decisionmaking strategies in the service of global goals. The right assessment is
more catholic: both strategies have virtues and vices that
vary across contexts, and the two strategies can often be
usefully combined. In general, and thus in the interpretive
setting as well, optimizers and satisficers can join forces to
reject simplemindedly maximizing interpretation without
having to stage a second-round runoff to choose a single
winner. The choice between optimizing and satisficing will
turn on particular features of the decisionmaking context,
especially the nature and size of the stakes.
Proponents of satisficing tax optimizing with a problem of infinite regress. Optimizers stop searching for better
alternatives, including better interpretations, when the costs
of further search exceed the expected gain in new information (about legislative intentions, ordinary meaning, and
so on). Yet information is a good with unusual properties.
One cannot know what the value of new information will
be until one has it. "To maximize subject to the constraint
of information cost one would have to know the expected
value of information, but this is not in general possible."
On this view, satisficing is the only alternative to simpleminded maximizing, because optimizing under conditions
of limited information is a contradiction in terms.
The infinite-regress problem, however, is best understood as a contextual caution rather than a foundational
difficulty. In some settings, especially when making a string
of similar decisions, decisionmakers can confidently expect
that the next bit of information to turn up will be of limited value, even if they do not know what that information
will be. Searching a very large database of employment
opportunities, I might rationally calculate that the costs of
further search exceed the benefits. Even if I cannot know
what the next opportunity I turn up will be-perhaps it
is something far superior to any of the ones I have seen so
far-I can rationally assess the chances of its being superior, because I have observed a long series of similar entries,
know something about how the database was compiled,
and thus have no good reason to expect anything different
in the future. Experience supplies prior probabilities from
which decisionmakers can generate rational expectations
ADRIAN VERMEULE
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about the benefits of future information.
In the interpretive setting, interpreters or other interpreters can draw upon prior experience to form rational
assessments of the value of the next bit of information
about, say, legislative intentions, even if they do not know
the content of that information. Much will depend upon
the conditions under which optimizing is deployed. Some
interpretive decisions are of a sort that are repeated frequently, some are not. Where experience suggests that
new options or new information can be expected to differ somewhat but not radically from previous options or
information, so that the expected value of further search is
predictably a medium-sized quantity that can be meaningfully compared to the costs of further search, it would be
hard to deny that optimizing interpretation is possible.
So the argument from infinite regress cannot knock
optimizing out of the ring. Is there a general argument
against satisficing? The most common criticism is that satisficing is arbitrary, because the bare idea of satisficing says
nothing about where exactly the satisficer's aspiration level
should be set. Why should interpreters be satisfied with this
much rather than that much evidence of legislative intentions, or ordinary meaning? Again, however, the force of
this point varies across settings. Aspiration levels need not
be exogenously fixed once and for all; they can be endogenously formed, as decisionmakers acquire experience
with the relevant settings. In many domains, experience
will suggest that the band within which an aspiration level
might plausibly be set will be quite narrow. In the cafeteria
example, no one would continue the search until a gourmet meal turns up, simply because it is quite predictable
that no such meal will ever turn up; the context will not
support any such aspiration. Although such practical considerations are not conceptually satisfying, it is not clear
that satisficing rules themselves have or need have any aspiration to be conceptually satisfying. So long as they fulfill
their primary mission of truncating local search at a point
that is globally maximizing, they are good enough.
These mutual criticisms by optimizers and satisficers
point to a commonsensical conclusion. Neither optimizing nor satisficing is universally or acontextually best; the
choice between stopping rules will and should vary as the
features of the interpretive setting vary. A large challenge,
one I cannot take on here, would be to delineate the conditions under which one stopping rule or the other is superior.
As a preliminary matter, however, a useful idea is to focus
on the size of the stakes at hand in the decision. On one
hand, with very low-stakes decisions, satisficing appears
8
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most attractive, relative to optimizing. "The less we care
about the gap between satisfactory and optimal toothpaste,
for example, the more reason we have to satisfice-to look
for a satisfactory brand and then stop searching when we
find it." On the other hand, where the stakes are very high,
especially where decisions involve a choice between seemingly incommensurable values or life plans, satisficing also
appears useful, perhaps inevitable. In the choice whether
to become a doctor or a soldier, it is quite unclear what it
would mean to collect an optimal amount of information
before making a decision, and the best we can hope for
is to make a satisfactory choice. On this view, optimizing
makes most sense for decisions with medium-sized stakes.
In those settings, the expected benefit of collecting more
information or generating new options is appreciable but
also limited, and thus meaningfully comparable to the
costs of further search.
Many interpretive decisions are plausibly mediumstakes problems, in which any of the possible interpretations
will be consequential for the legal system but none will be
of overwhelming importance. An even larger fraction of
interpretive decisions, however, are the law's equivalent of
picking toothpaste in a store, at least from the interpreter's
point of view. These are cases important to the parties at
hand, but with few broader consequences for other cases,
actors, or problems. Such cases probably dominate in the
interpretive work of administrative agencies and lower
courts; some might claim that they are not uncommon on
the Supreme Court's docket. To move beyond the conceptual mapping of interpretive strategies I offer here, we would
need to think about which interpretive strategies might be
best at different levels of the legal system, when used by
different interpreters with distinct roles and institutional
capacities. We might find, for example, that satisficing is
best for interpreters in the low-stakes settings that predominate in the ordinary work of law, while interpreters working
in more consequential settings might do better to optimize.
Here I merely indicate the importance of these institutional
questions, without offering answers to them.
IV. THE PREVALENCE OF MAXIMIZING: SOME
MECHANISMS
I have criticized maximizing interpretation and offered
qualified praise, varying across contexts, for the optimizing
and satisficing alternatives. But if maximizing interpretation
is so simpleminded, why does it have so many defenders-both on the bench and in the academy? Here I will
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survey some mechanisms that tend to push interpreters past
the point at which optimizers or satisficers will abandon
the hope of local perfection and cut off the search for
further evidence.
Self-interested motivation. For Bentham, the mechanism was obvious: self-interested collusive behavior on the
part of judges, lawyers and other legal actors. Maximizing
interpretation is, above all, complex interpretation. The
simplemindedly maximizing local interpreter is far more
likely to take into account a rich and complex array of
considerations, sources and evidence bearing on the interpretive problem at hand. For Bentham, complexity was
the fruit of conspiracy. Judge & Co. benefit jointly and
severally from a highly complex, even mysterious legal system in which laypeople must pay rents to lawyers to steer
through the thickets that the lawyers themselves have created. Although the claim rests on far too simpleminded
an account of the motivations of lawyers and judges, it
had better institutional foundations when Bentham wrote;
consider that judges were commonly paid from the fees of
litigants, and that one of Benthams principal reforms was
to urge that judges be put on regular government salaries.
Cost-externalization. Peter Schuck puts Bentham's
argument in more modern terms, and less conspiratorial
ones, by observing that the costs and benefits of complex
legal interpretation are unequally distributed over different
actors and groups. If maximizing interpretation is complex
interpretation, as I have claimed, then Schuck's argument
also suggests that maximizing interpreters may push the
search for evidence beyond the bounds that would limit
an optimizing or satisficing interpreter, just because maximizing interpreters do not themselves internalize all the
costs-including opportunity costs and decision costs-of
maximizing interpretation. Consider a possible claim that
maximizing intentionalism, with its exhaustive search
through legislative history and other sources, is feasible for
judges only because many of the resulting decision costs are
externalized onto litigants and other legal actors.
Neglect of opportunity costs. Bentham's account, as
updated by Schuck, points to self-interested motivations
on the part of lawyers, judges, and other legal actors. But
there is a cognitive mechanism operating as well, one
that plausibly affects even public-spirited actors. I refer to
the neglect of opportunity costs, relative to more visible
direct costs. Neglect of opportunity costs tends to make
decisionmaking excessively intensive and complex, in the
maximizing style, rather than brisk and mechanical, in the
optimizing and satisficing styles. Decisionmakers focus to
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excess on the costs of getting this decision wrong, while
overlooking the costs that a protracted process of decisionmaking itself creates. "The neglect of the opportunity costs
that are created by the fact that decision making takes time
is . . . an important and pervasive source of irrationality."
An ethical analogy and the distortingforce of particulars.An analogy to ethics is useful here. The choice between
maximizing, on the one hand, and optimizing or satisficing
on the other, has some of the same intellectual structure as
the choice between rule-utilitarianism, which counsels that
ethical subjects act in accordance with rules whose observance will maximize overall utility, and act-utilitarianism,
which counsels ethical subjects directly to choose whichever action maximizes overall utility. The rule-utilitarian
acknowledges that the utility-maximizing rules may sometimes call for actions that, when viewed in isolation, are
locally suboptimal from the utilitarian point of view. The
rule-utilitarian, then, will sometimes be placed in the awkward position of defending acts whose immediate effect is,
when viewed in isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it is
the easiest thing in the world for maximizing interpreters
to emphasize specific cases in which stopping rules produce
interpretive blunders, relative to an all-things-considered
approach that would (if applied by an infallible interpreter
with infinite time to make decisions) have taken into
account relevant information excluded by a stopping rule.
A corollary is that second-order interpretive strategies
suffer from the distortingforce ofparticulars. Maximizers
will always be able to point to lurid examples in which
second-order strategies produce suboptimal results, even if
second-order strategies are best from some overall perspective. Such examples pack a strong rhetorical punch, but the
problem goes deeper than that. The vivid costs in particular cases may trigger cognitive failings in the audience that
is to evaluate the competing decisionmaking strategies,
causing them to overreact to specifics while ignoring the
crucial question of overall justification. A crucial mechanism here is salience, a heuristic that causes decisionmakers
to overweight the importance of vivid, concrete foreground
information and to underweight the importance of abstract,
aggregated background information.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with some mixed notes of pessimism and optimism. If simpleminded local maximizing is intellectually
untenable, it is also remarkably persistent in the theory
and practice of legal interpretation, by virtue of the mechaADRIAN VERMEULE
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nisms discussed in Part IV. We can at least hope, however,
to make interpreters and students of interpretation aware
that the maximizing style is not inevitable, that it represents
a particular choice among local decisionmaking strategies,
and that local maximizing is by no means obviously desirable from the globally-maximizing perspective. This point
is only preliminary, for it does nothing to indicate what
interpretive strategies are actually best in various settings.
The subsequent questions are empirical, and involve the
institutional capacities of interpreters. But in a legal system
that still respects the claims of maximizing interpretation,
it is a good place to start.
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